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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Second Review report provides an assessment of the progress made by Spain with 
respect to its Financial Assistance Programme for the Recapitalisation of Financial 
Institutions, based on the findings of a joint European Commission (EC)/European Central 
Bank1 (ECB) mission to Madrid during 28 January – 1 February 2013. The mission found 
that the programme, and more widely the reform of the financial sector, is on track. The 
policy conditionality of the programme has so far been met despite ambitious deadlines. It 
will be important to maintain the momentum as persistent efforts are needed to compound 
the progress achieved to date and to overcome the still significant challenges, so that a 
successful conclusion to the programme may be assured. 
1. Since the last review, Spain's access to financial markets has further improved 
thanks to increased investor confidence. Favourable developments in global capital 
markets and effective initiatives at European level have improved the climate for foreign 
investors to return to Spanish markets. This has resulted in better market access by the 
Spanish sovereign and private borrowers. Government bond yields declined by more than 2 
percentage points in the second half of 2012 and issuance of bank debt resumed in January 
2013, although still at high financing costs. Due to their improved liquidity positions, 
Spanish banks contributed with significant amounts to the early repayment of the long-term 
refinancing operations (LTRO) and reliance on the Eurosystem diminished by about 25% 
since the peak reached in August 2012. Despite the significant progress, a degree of 
uncertainty exists on whether these improvements would consolidate, as banks' profitability 
remains under pressure. On the domestic front, the satisfactory compliance with the 
conditions imposed in the Memorandum of Understanding has also contributed to the 
stabilisation of the banking sector and to the return of investor confidence. Overall, the 
reform momentum needs to be preserved as risks to the economy and the financial sector 
remain high. 
2. Significant progress in separating impaired assets from banks has been achieved 
since the last review, with the start of operations by Sareb2. Against the background of a 
necessarily demanding timeline, the Spanish authorities have succeeded in designing, 
implementing and operationalizing this entity with the first, and largest, transfer of assets 
from banks to Sareb occurring on time. Much work remains ahead in this regard, however, 
and the coming months will be devoted to making Sareb fully operational. A sound business 
plan will be the foundation upon which the success of Sareb will rest, so it is of the utmost 
importance that this plan should be both robust and credible. 
3. The implementation of the horizontal financial-sector conditionality has been 
further advanced and is close to completion in most areas. The reform of the governance 
of the savings banks, a review of supervisory procedures at Banco de España (BdE), 
reforms of the regulatory frameworks governing banks' credit concentration and 
provisioning, and the enhancement of the credit register are still on-going. In all these areas, 
the Spanish authorities have achieved or are very close to achieving compliance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and have made very tangible progress towards 
major and lasting reforms in these areas. These reforms must be speedily implemented in 
order to allow them to enhance the viability of the Spanish banking sector. 
                                                     
1  The mission also involved expert teams from the European Stability Mechanism and the European Banking Authority. The 
International Monetary Fund participated in the meetings as part of its independent monitoring. 
2  The Spanish asset management company. 
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4. The macroeconomic situation remains challenging, with very high and rising 
unemployment, GDP contraction and a need to reduce large stocks of internal and 
external debt. The rebalancing of the economy is on-going, as robust export growth and 
very weak domestic demand contribute to a narrowing of the current account deficit. 
Notwithstanding the significant policy progress already made, further determined advances 
remain necessary in the consolidation of public finances - including reinforcing the 
institutional framework - and in the swift completion and implementation of the structural 
reform agenda, along the lines specified in last year's country–specific recommendations. 
5. While credit contraction has been gaining speed, as the economy slipped again 
into recession and the rebalancing process accelerated, this seems mostly due to the 
necessary deleveraging of exposures toward the construction and real estate developer 
sectors and to falling credit demand. Although it is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions 
on the forces driving the decline in lending activity, it appears that the flow of credit to the 
more dynamic sectors of the economy is less constrained than the shrinking stock of total 
credit would suggest. In particular, the significant increase in impairment allowances and 
the technical balance-sheet effect of the transfer of assets to the Sareb play an important role 
in the declining banking sector balances whereas deleveraging reflects the necessary 
rebalancing of the Spanish economy towards more productive sectors. Since the onset of the 
crisis, the pace of deleveraging in the private sector does not appear excessive given the 
significant adjustment challenge and was moreover cushioned by an increase in leverage in 
the public sector.  
6. There is at present no reason to foresee further programme disbursements. Two 
disbursements were made so far in a total amount of about EUR 41.4 billion for the 
recapitalisation of State Aided banks and the capital injection into Sareb. The rest of the 
Spanish banks either were not diagnosed with a capital shortfall in the stress test or were 
able to cover it by private means.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
7. This report assesses Spain's compliance with the conditionality of the Financial 
Assistance Programme. A delegation from the European Commission, in liaison with the 
European Central Bank, the European Stability Mechanism and the European Banking 
Authority, completed the second review of the financial sector assistance programme for 
Spain from 28 January to 1 February 2013. The International Monetary Fund also 
participated in the review, fulfilling its role as an independent monitor.  
8. The Programme, which was agreed by the Eurogroup on 9 July 2012 and covers 
a period of 18 months3, entails an external financing by the euro area Member States 
of up to EUR 100 billion. On 3 December 2012, the Eurogroup made the first review on 
the progress on the Programme4 and welcomed the decision by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to authorise the disbursement of the first tranche of up to 
EUR 39.5 billion. Spain has used close to EUR 37 billion for the recapitalisation of Group 1 
banks, for which the EC had adopted restructuring and resolution plans on 28 November 
2012, and up to EUR 2.5 billion for capitalising Sareb. On 21 January 2013, the Eurogroup 
endorsed and on 28 January 2013 the ESM approved the second disbursement under the 
programme5 of about EUR 1.9 billion for the recapitalisation of Group 2 banks, for which 
the EC had adopted restructuring plans on 20 December 2012.  
9. The Memorandum of Understanding provides for bank-specific conditionality, 
in line with State aid rules, as well as horizontal conditionality. Since the last review, 
important progress with the two parts of conditionality has been made and the 
programme continues to be on track. The review report assesses conditions with a 
deadline prior to end-January 2013, including those which were met or those toward which 
there was substantial progress ahead of their deadline. The cut-off date for the information 
included in the report is 15 February 2013. 
10. The bank-specific conditionality has advanced in all its three main components: 
• First, a comprehensive diagnostic as regards the capital needs of individual banks, 
based on a comprehensive asset quality review and valuation process, and bank-by-
bank stress tests was performed. The assumptions under which the robust and 
independent bank stress test was conducted remain in general valid. 
• Second, an external Asset Management Company (AMC) called Sareb was set up 
and became operational in its basic functions. The segregation of impaired assets 
from the balance sheet of banks receiving public support and their transfer to Sareb 
has started with the largest batch from Group 1 banks. Sareb will need to become 
fully operational based on a comprehensive business plan and complete the transfer 
of assets from Group 2 banks.  
• Third, the restructuring and resolution plans of the banks with a capital shortfall 
identified in the stress test and unable to cover it fully by private means were 
adopted and the recapitalisation of viable banks is almost completed. The 
                                                     
3  However, the restructuring of the banks receiving public support under the State aid rules is expected to take up to five years. 
4  See Spain's first compliance report with the programme conditionality at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/op121_en.htm 
5  See the update on Spain's compliance with the programme conditionality at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op126_en.htm 
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restructuring of the State-aided banks needs to be fully implemented now, including 
by conducting the burden sharing exercises.  
11. The horizontal conditionality applies to the entire banking sector, unlike bank-
specific conditions, and significant progress has been made since the inception of the 
programme, in particular as the MoU conditionality was frontloaded. The horizontal 
programme includes measures aimed, inter alia, at strengthening the regulatory, supervisory 
and bank resolution frameworks, enhancing the governance structure of savings banks and 
of commercial banks controlled by them, improving consumer protection legislation as 
regards the sale by banks of hybrid capital and subordinated debt instruments. Work 
remains on-going only in a limited number of areas, including the reform of the governance 
of the savings banks, a review of supervisory procedures at Banco de España, reforms of the 
regulatory frameworks governing banks' credit concentration and provisioning, and the 
enhancement of the credit register. However, in all these areas, the Spanish authorities have 
achieved or are close to achieving compliance with the MoU. 
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2 RECENT FINANCIAL, MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1 FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS 
12. During the last quarter of 2012 and until the end of January 2013, Spain  
enjoyed improved access to financial markets and investor confidence consolidated. 
Spanish government bond yields have declined further and purchases by the private foreign 
sector have resumed. Liquidity constraints on the Spanish banking sector have also 
subsided. However, a certain degree of uncertainty exists on the permanent nature of the 
improvements observed. Government bond yields rose again recently, partly eroding a rally 
that brought down yields by more than 2 percentage points from the euro area record highs 
in July. New data confirming the negative momentum in the real economy together with 
some domestic political turbulence explain some deterioration observed from the end of 
January in the risk assigned to Spain by financial agents (see  Graph 1 and  Graph 2).  
 Graph 1: Euro area sovereign spreads to the  
10-year German bund 
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13. The improvement in the access of Spain to financial markets has been the 
consequence of a combination of both international and domestic factors.  These 
enabling factors include: the consensus reached by the European Council on the basis for 
the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism, the release of the EC's blueprint on 
how to complete the Economic and Monetary Union and, on the domestic side,  the 
satisfactory compliance with the conditions imposed in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU).  The approval of restructuring and resolution plans of the Spanish banks which have 
received State aid, the capitalisation measures taken in the banks where capital needs were 
detected by the independent stress test, and the creation of the Sareb and the successful 
transfer of assets to it, have significantly contributed to cleaning up the Spanish banking 
system and restoring investor confidence. The capacity to generate sustainable profits in a 
recessionary environment is now the main challenge to be faced by the Spanish banks.  
14. Financing conditions for the banking sector continued to improve leading to a 
gradual decline in Eurosystem refinancing and a pick-up of issuance of secured and 
unsecured debt. The reliance on net borrowing from the Eurosystem diminished to 
EUR 313 billion in December 2012 from a record EUR 389 billion in August. The fall in 
domestic retail and corporate deposits has decelerated significantly to around 0.2% y-o-y in 
November 2012 from 6.5% in July, as both items increased again in recent months (see  
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Graph 3). Furthermore, the significant non-resident outflows of about EUR 80 billion (or 
18.5% of total) during May-August 2012 came to an end despite a temporary rebound in 
November. The relatively benign evolution in December seems to confirm the positive 
trend. 
15. Issuance of bank debt resumed.  The issuance of secured, unsecured and covered 
bonds by credit institutions continued in January 2013 and amounted to EUR 10.5 billion. 
That includes not only Group 0 banks' issuances but also two bonds issuances from former 
Group 3 Banco Popular (see Table 1). Non-financial corporates have also returned to the 
market and issued EUR 5.1 billion of bonds in January 2013. While it is encouraging that 
certain institutions have returned to the market, funding costs remain elevated relative to 
pre-crisis levels.  
 Graph 3: Bank deposits  Graph 4: Bank loans6 
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16. Due to their improved liquidity positions, Spanish banks were in a position to 
participate with a significant amount in the early repayment of the LTRO in late 
January. It represents another positive sign that the liquidity constraints in the banking 
sector have abated recently. At the same time, the underlying risk/return determinants 
behind such high participation of Spanish banks and the impact of early repayment on their 
profitability and liquidity conditions going forward merit further analysis.  
Table 1: Issuances, January 2013 
ISSUER AMOUNT (million) SPREAD TYPE
BBVA 1,500  295  Unsecured
CaixaBank 1,000  285  Unsecured
BPE Financiaciones (Banco Popular) 750  364  Unsecured
Bankinter 500  220  Covered
Banco de Sabadell 1,000  250  Unsecured
Banco Popular 500  270  Covered
Santander Internacional 1,000  275  Notes
BBVA 1,000  215  Covered
Kutxabank 750  220  Covered
Santander 2,000  195  Covered
Bankinter 500  220  Covered
Total 10,500   
Source: BdE and ECFIN calculations 
                                                     
6 The significant decline in loans in December partially reflects the accounting effect of the extraordinary transfer of assets from 
Group 1 banks to Sareb. 
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17. The better access to funding markets by Spanish banks was also reflected in 
rising share prices and lower risk premia. In line with sovereign exposures, CDS spreads 
for banks have declined over the last months showing a better perception from the markets 
on banks' risks. Moreover, stock prices have also improved for several banks (see Graph 5 
and Graph 6). 
Graph 5: CDS spreads (basis points) Graph 6: Share price indices 
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18. The decline in lending has continued against the backdrop of deleveraging in the 
real estate and construction sectors. While bank loans continue to trend down, a 
significant portion of the decline seen in the data is related to the transfer of assets to Sareb 
in December 2012. Therefore, this data is not an accurate reflection of the reduction in the 
flow of credit to Spanish households and firms, due to the accounting effect of the 
transactions related to Sareb and the recapitalisation of the Group 1 institutions worth about 
EUR 56 billion. As of December 2012, total non-MFI domestic credit shrunk by about 8% 
year-on-year being driven by the decline in the stock of credit to the private sector of almost 
10% year-on-year. Domestic lending to non-financial corporations and households fell by 
15.8% and 4% year-on-year, respectively (see  Graph 4: Bank loans). If the accounting 
effect of the transfer of assets to Sareb is left out, the annual reduction in the stock of credit 
was about 5.3% for the total non-MFI domestic sector and 9.3% for non-financial 
corporations. At the same time, the increase in credit to the government continued at around 
27% year-on-year. 
19. Credit supply is mainly constrained by the weaker solvent demand in a 
recessionary environment, but also by the banks' efforts to rebuild capital ratios and 
by more prudent lending policies. The acceleration in the decline of the stock of credit to 
the domestic private sector needs to be seen in the broader context of the economic 
rebalancing that affects the entire economy and in particular sectors such as construction 
and the real estate. As a matter of fact, a more granular analysis shows that the pace of 
decline in lending to domestic residents (non-MFI) as of the third quarter of 2012 was 3.5% 
y-o-y instead of 4.8% if construction and real estate activities loans are excluded. In a 
similar way, the pace of decline in net loans (-5.5% y-o-y) is much higher than the decline 
in the stock of gross loans (-1.2% y-o-y) at the end of November 2012 due to a significant 
increase in impairment allowances. Given the necessity to acknowledge and build 
impairment allowances for the bad debts on the balance sheet of the banks and in the 
economy in general, this shows that new credit flows to the viable part of the economy are 
not necessarily impaired by the decline in the stock of credit. This seems broadly in line 
with the main objective of the programme to restructure and clean-up the balance sheet of 
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banks from legacy assets, without unduly constraining the flow of lending to the viable part 
of the economy. 
20. The main constraints to the provision of credit by the domestic banking sector 
related to their capitalisation and access to funding have started to ease in recent 
months. They should gradually translate into an improved credit market if the macro-
economic conditions related to solvent credit demand allow for it. Furthermore, one needs 
to look at the total amount of credit in the economy and not only at the one provided by the 
domestic banking sector. For example, domestic credit to non-financial corporations(NFCs) 
was declining at 8% y-o-y as of December 2012, whereas external loans declined by only 
0.5% y-o-y and corporate bonds issued increased by 12.5% y-o-y. Overall, the decline in 
total credit to non-financial corporates was thus 5.2% y-o-y instead of 8%. 
21. Deleveraging is necessary in the sectors that over expanded in the boom in order 
to allow the economy to adjust and grow again in a sustainable manner (please see 
Chapter 6.1 in Annex for a more detailed analysis). As non-viable firms leave the market, 
factors of production are freed to allow the recovery in the viable part of the economy. 
Private sector deleveraging gained speed as of 2012 when the Spanish economy dived into 
its second recession in the last four years.  The process started relatively late in the crisis7 
and was slow, leading to a decline in leverage of about 15% of GDP from its peak in 2010 
to mid-2012, mostly due to a fall in non-financial corporation debt. In the meantime, public 
sector indebtedness grew constantly since 2008, reaching around 86% of GDP in 2012 
according to the EC Autumn Forecast. This represents an increase of about 45% of GDP 
over the period, which means that leverage has actually increased in the total economy since 
the beginning of the crisis (see Graph 7). 
22. The restructuring of the banking sector is visible in the downsizing of banks and 
an increase in their efficiency. The number of branches and employees has continued to 
decrease in the third quarter of 2012, so that they reached their pre-crisis levels. It 
represents a cumulative reduction of about 13% from December 2008 to September 2012 
for both indicators and boosted bank efficiency by depressing operating costs. Operating 
expenses grew modestly by 0.2% y-o-y as of June 2012. If Spanish banks with a large 
presence abroad are left out, operating expenses dropped by 8.5%. In the savings banks 
sector, where the restructuring process has been deeper during 2011-2012 (see Chapter 3.2 
for a more detailed analysis), the efficiency ratio  improved significantly during the year 
preceding the third quarter of 2012 as it declined from 64% to 53%. 
23. Banking sector results and the provision of credit to the real economy have 
continued to be affected by adverse developments in asset quality. The deterioration in 
asset quality continued in the second half of 2012, as non-performing loans reached 11.4% 
of total loans in November 2012 compared to 9.7% at the end of June 2012. Similar to the 
first half of 2012, the increase in impaired assets at system level was mainly driven by the 
on-going deterioration of the exposures to the real estate and construction sector, where 
non-performing loans surpassed 30% at the end of September 2012 . Non-performing loans 
in the household sector continued to remain far below the system level and went up to 4.5% 
at the end of September 2012 (see Graph 8). The relatively low level of impairment on the 
loans to households has been the result of the relatively good performance of the residential 
mortgage portfolio (see Box 1), as non-performing loans for mortgage loans stood at 
roughly 4% at the end of September 2012.  
                                                     
7 During 2008 to 2010 private debt kept increasing by about 7% of GDP, also due to the decline in nominal GDP over the period. 
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Graph 7: Gross debt by sector as a % of GDP Graph 8: Non-performing loans (% of total loans) 
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Box 1: Residential mortgages: where do we stand? 
Despite significant strains in the banking sector, residential mortgage portfolios have remained 
relatively resilient during the crisis (see Graph 8 on non-performing loans). The delinquency 
ratio for residential mortgages is relatively low. It reached a peak in 2009 and, although it has 
been slightly increasing since September 2011, remains quite stable at around 3.5% as of 
September 2012. Furthermore, non-performing loans (NPLs) for primary dwellings seems to be 
even lower.  Misclassifications of credits in the retail portfolio (including mortgages) detected 
by auditors during the bottom-up stress test were almost negligible (less than 0.1%) while they 
were higher in the SME portfolios. 
Several factors could explain this relatively high quality of retail mortgage portfolios, among 
which: (i) relatively lower loan-to-value (LTV) ratios [on average around 62%]; (ii) a relatively 
low level of unemployment amongst residential loan holders8; (iii) a low level of restructured 
operations and (iv) the low and recently fallen level of interest rates. The Euribor 12-months 
rate decreased by 70% during 2012. As a result, mortgage interest rates have significantly 
decreased. On average, Spanish households today pay around 40% less in a monthly mortgage 
payment as compared to the end of 2008. Housing affordability measured by the housing price 
index in relation to gross available income has decreased from 6.7 in 2010 to around 6 in 20129.       
Nevertheless, this latter point explaining relatively stable mortgage portfolios also bears a 
potential risk for the future: the vast majority of mortgages loans in Spain provide for a floating 
rate normally linked to the Euribor. Therefore, mortgages portfolios are extremely sensible to 
any rate increase that could put more pressure on households' burden.  In addition, the economic 
outlook will determine the evolution of residential mortgages delinquency ratios. 
Mortgage portfolios have experienced some corrections recently which also point to increased 
resilience going forward. After an important decrease during the last years, average mortgage 
loans amount to around EUR 100 000, about 30% less than in 2008. Average maturity has also 
declined from almost 28 years in 2008 to 23.3 at the end of 201210. In addition, the total 
outstanding amount of residential mortgages has significantly decreased from the end of 2009 
and stands now at 2006 pre-crisis levels. 
                                                     
8  While unemployment in Spain has exceeded 26%, according to recent data only 7% to 9% of total outstanding mortgages were 
signed by people currently unemployed. Moreover, while unemployment is concentrated in certain groups, in particular 
affecting young people (the unemployment rate for people below 30 years is 40%), mortgages signed by them are around 4% of 
the total amount. 
9  Banco de España. Summary indicators. Housing market indicators. 
10  Asociación Española Hipotecaria: "Boletín Trimestral". February 2013. 
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24. The increase in loan-loss provisions has continued to weigh on banking sector 
profitability. Notwithstanding the challenging economic environment, interest income has 
remained resilient for the majority of banks. However, despite sustained efforts to increase 
efficiency and the positive effects for banks involved in carry trade on sovereign bonds, 
profitability at system level has continued to be markedly impacted by the increase in loan-
loss provisions, in particular for real estate and construction sector exposures. Against the 
backdrop of these developments, the return on equity at system level stood at -8.7% at the 
end of September 2012. 
25. Spanish banks are better capitalised to withstand a severe shock. The 
recapitalisation of Group 1 banks and the raising of capital of other banks, together with the 
transfer of assets to Sareb, will boost capital ratios above the current regulatory minimum 
capital levels. Consequently, Spanish banks have a stronger loss absorbing capacity. 
Furthermore, recent data shows that in general terms banks are over-performing the 
conservative estimates used in the most severe scenario of the stress test in terms of pre-
provisioning profitability (see Box 2). As a result, on average, the loss-absorbing capacity 
observed so far, is higher than what was assumed in the stress test.  
26. The front-loading of losses through a strict provisioning regime and the transfer 
of assets to Sareb have resulted in the early recognition of a significant proportion of 
the losses estimated in the bottom-up stress test. A very high volume of provisions were 
recorded in 2012 and transfers to Sareb were effected at a transfer price equivalent to the 
maximum losses estimated in the adverse scenario of the stress test. In addition, Spanish 
banks perform better than their international peers in terms of capital to total assets, which 
may suggest that Spanish banks' calculations of risk-weighted assets are more conservative. 
These factors explain why the average capital levels of Spanish banks have not increased to 
the same levels as banks in other programme countries that have undergone comprehensive 
stress tests.  
27. Nevertheless, banks must ensure that adequate capital buffers continue to be 
maintained. In the near-term, the introduction of specific rules which raise the minimum 
core tier 1 capital level to 9% for Spanish banks will be an impetus in this direction. In the 
medium to long-term, banks should build additional capital buffers as a result of the gradual 
implementation of the forthcoming EU capital requirements legislation (CRD IV and CRR 
I) taking into account more stringent capital definitions which will reduce capital levels of 
some banks.  
28. Consequently, Spanish banks should adopt prudent dividend policies by 
retaining a higher share of profits or paying dividends in shares in order to generate 
additional capital internally. In fact, some banks have begun to implement these kind of 
policies aiming at reducing pay-out levels through the so-called "scrip dividends". 
However, this has not been the case for all banks in 2012 since some of them have 
increased substantially their pay-out levels and even paid out, in cash, more than 50% of 
their annual profits. 
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Box 2: Results of the Oliver Wyman stress test:  are they still a valid reference? 
The bottom-up stress test exercise carried out by Oliver Wyman (OW) for the Spanish banking 
system published in September 2012, based on actual data until December 2011, provided a 
thorough assessment of the situation in the Spanish banking system, assessed the quality of 
banks'  portfolios and identified capital shortfalls for certain credit institutions under two 
macroeconomic scenarios (a baseline and an adverse scenario).  
In light of current developments in the Spanish banking sector and in the economy at large, the 
results of OW exercise remain conservative and a valid reference for assessing the forward-
looking solvency of Spanish banks. In this regard the following considerations can be made:  
• Comparing estimates from OW and actual figures, it seems that, at present, both the 
Spanish economy and the banking sector are far from reaching the projected adverse 
scenario, except in the case of unemployment and the evolution of interest rates where 
developments are more in line with the OW severe scenario.  
• The GDP real growth baseline scenarios by OW for 2012, 2013 and 2014 is in total for 
that period broadly in line with current EC and IMF forecasts. However, under the 
adverse scenario, OW assumed declines in GDP growth significantly larger than those 
currently predicted by the EC and the IMF with available data. Therefore, it seems that 
the output growth scenarios used by OW can be considered as a prudent and 
conservative reference. 
• Regarding unemployment, in the light of EC and IMF forecasts for 2012, 2013 and 
2014, the OW baseline scenario seems slightly optimistic, while the adverse scenario 
for this variable is more in line with latest international forecasts.  
• The comparison between observed house price developments and those assumed in the 
stress test is difficult because house prices are always subject to a high degree of 
heterogeneity. Notwithstanding this, under the adverse scenario, OW applied an average 
haircut of -64% on foreclosed assets, which can be considered as conservative given 
current developments in  house prices. 
Despite a slight deterioration of the macroeconomic framework in 2012, in relation to the 
baseline scenario of the OW exercise, the vast majority of Spanish banks have exceeded 
expectations in their capacity to generate profits. In terms of pre-provisioning profits, most 
credit institutions are significantly above OW estimates. Spanish banks have in fact increased 
their loss absorption capacity and solvency in the middle of a challenging year as a result of two 
measures (RDL 2/2012 11 and RDL 18/2012 12) that impose stricter provisioning requirements. 
 
2.2 MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 
29. The economy continues to contract as domestic demand faces strong headwinds. 
Private sector deleveraging and fiscal consolidation are on-going, weighing on private and 
public consumption and investment. Very high unemployment is eroding disposable 
income. Financing conditions for households and firms remain tight despite improvements 
in financial markets.  
30. Net exports are supporting GDP growth. According to the flash estimates, GDP 
fell by 0.7% (q-o-q) in the fourth quarter of 2012, compared to -0.3% in the third quarter. In 
                                                     
11  http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/rdl2-2012.html 
12  http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Derogadas/r1-rdl18-2012.html 
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annual terms, GDP fell by 1.4% in 2012, after growing by 0.4% in 2011. The short-term 
growth profile was affected by the advancement of purchases to the third quarter of 2012, 
due to the VAT rate hike in September, and by the fact that the impact of fiscal measures 
announced in July was concentrated at the end of the year. Exports have been resilient 
during the crisis and are expected to continue to support growth, thanks to increased 
geographical diversification. At the same time, weak imports reflect the fall in domestic 
demand. As a result, the current account deficit keeps adjusting, and is expected to reach a 
surplus of around 1% of GDP in 2013 according to the Commission services' 2013 Winter 
Forecast.   
31. The recession is set to continue into 2013. GDP is expected to contract by a further 
1.4% in 2013, still driven by a contraction of domestic demand and a positive contribution 
of net exports. Output is expected to stabilise and start recovering around the end of 2013 
allowing for some positive growth of around 0.8% in 2014 (assuming no policy changes).   
32. Employment is still declining fast, while the moderation in wages is not fully 
reflected in prices. Employment fell by 4.8% (y-o-y) in the fourth quarter of 2012, 
according to the Labour Force Survey (see  Graph 9). Social security data for January show 
that the deterioration is continuing. The unemployment rate rose to 26% at the end of 2012, 
while wage growth is moderating. Combined with significant increases in measured 
productivity (partly due to labour shedding), this is resulting in falling unit labour costs and 
improving international cost competitiveness (see Graph 10). Further improvements in cost 
competitiveness are expected going forward. Inflation, measured by HICP, was slightly 
below 3% in January, mainly driven by hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices, 
although price rigidities are likely to be contributing to it. Inflation is expected to moderate 
in 2013 and fall below 2% by year end. 
 
Graph 9: Employment and contract duration Graph 10: Productivity and wages 
  
Source: Thomson Reuters EcoWin. Source: BdE, INE. 
 
33. The 6.3% of GDP deficit target in 2012 was missed in spite of large consolidation 
efforts. The cumulated general government deficit for the first three quarters of 2012 was 
EUR 65.3 billion (8.3% of cumulated quarterly GDP), including bank recapitalisation 
measures of around EUR 10 billion (1% of GDP). The indicators available for the fourth 
quarter point to relatively strong tax receipts, reflecting the impact of  measures in the areas 
of VAT and corporate income tax. These measures offset significant underlying revenue 
shortfalls as the economy shifts from tax-rich consumption-based growth to export-led 
growth. The Autonomous Communities showed a deficit of slightly below EUR 12 billion 
for the first three quarters (1.1% of full-year GDP, adjusted for advance transfers from the 
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central government). This is an improvement since the first half of the year, when the deficit 
already stood at 0.9% of the full-year GDP. While discretionary expenditure cuts in the area 
of education are likely to be concentrated in the fourth quarter, there are risks to the 2012 
deficit target for the regions of 1.5% of GDP. The social security system is expected to post 
a deficit of above 1% of GDP, due to lower social contributions and higher transfers. The 
Commission services' 2013 Winter Forecast projects the deficit at 7% of GDP (excluding 
bank recapitalisation costs of 3.2% of GDP).13 The Spanish government reported a 2012 
deficit outcome of 6.7% of GDP at the end of February. 
  
                                                     
13  The cut-off date for the Winter Forecast was 15 February. 
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3 BANK RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING 
3.1 SEGREGATING THE BANKS' LEGACY ASSETS 
34. Despite the very challenging deadlines, Sareb, the Spanish asset management 
company, has made good progress towards becoming fully operational (see Box 3 on 
Sareb's main features). The first transfer of assets to Sareb took place on 31 of December. 
The Chairwoman and Managing Director of Sareb were designated on 14 November by the 
Board of FROB. Sareb has made significant progress in recruiting a management team and 
is intends to quickly hire additional staff. 
35. Sareb's main objective is to manage and disinvest the portfolio of assets 
transferred by stated aided banks in an orderly manner, optimizing levels of recovery 
and value preservation, minimizing the cost for the taxpayer, within a maximum timeframe 
of 15 years. In its disinvestment strategy Sareb is going to use both the retail channel (via 
transferring banks) as well as wholesale channel targeting institutional investors.   
36. The initial business plan of Sareb is now under revision. The business plan is 
being adjusted to incorporate new information on the evolution of the portfolio since end-
2011 (which was the basis for the initial business plan) as well as to take advantage of 
greater granularity of the available information on the assets owned by Sareb. The main 
focus of the business plan is to manage the vehicle in a manner which ensures sufficient 
liquidity and enhances the recovery value of Sareb's assets over time. 
37. Sareb is finalising servicing agreements with the transferring banks, which will 
continue to manage the assets. Such agreements include detailed procedures for managing 
the assets and  aim to create the right incentives for the effective management of the assets. 
In addition, transferring banks will offer vendor financing for the potential buyers of Sareb's 
assets with the same funding conditions offered to their own clients.  
38. Spanish banks will be competitors of Sareb. Spanish banks have adopted 
aggressive commercial practices to sell real estate properties rapidly in anticipation of the 
future competition with Sareb. Therefore, it is important that Sareb is able to offer its clients 
funding conditions that are in line with market conditions, so that it can compete on equal 
footing with the banks.  
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Box 3: Sareb – Main features of the Spanish AMC 
Perimeter and size: 
• After the first transfer of assets from Group 1 banks to Sareb, which took place on the 31st of 
December 2012, total real estate related assets amount to EUR 36.7 billion. The average 
haircut applied to these assets for their transfer is 54.5% relative to gross book value. More 
than 145,000 asset have been transferred thus far.  Of the total amount, EUR 8.72 billion are 
foreclosed real estate assets, EUR 16.62 billion are performing real-estate developers (RED) 
loans and EUR 11.91 billion are non-performing loans.  
• The value of assets to be transferred from group 2 banks to Sareb is expected to be around 
EUR 15 billion.  
• According to preliminary information, approximately half of the assets owned by Sareb are 
either land or loans backed by land as collateral.  Of the remaining assets, 35% correspond to 
finished properties.  
Capital 
• The capital required by Sareb for assets from group 1 banks has been fully disbursed both by 
private investors and the FROB. Furthermore, private investors have signed agreements in 
which they fully commit to provide the necessary capital once the remaining assets are 
transferred.  
• To date, investors have provided EUR 3.82 billion capital to Sareb. 52.6% of this capital 
belongs to private shareholders, of which, over 95% are credit institutions. The remaining 
private shareholders are mainly insurance companies. 
• After the transfer of the remaining assets to the AMC, total capital will be approximately 8% 
of total assets. 25% of this amount will be made up of equity while the remaining amount will 
consist of subordinated debt which is convertible into equity. A majority holding has been 
subscribed by private investors. 
Corporate governance 
• The Board of Directors will oversee the activities of the company, with a minimum of 5 and a 
maximum of 15 members, consisting of the Sareb shareholders (in proportion to their stake in 
equity and subordinated debt) and a number of independent directors. 
• Sareb's by-laws are in line with standard practice for Spanish listed companies. In particular, 
based on a statutory provision included in the Royal decree establishing SAREB, they forbid 
direct involvement in the board of Sareb of a person working in the real estate at one of the 
shareholder banks. 
• In mid-December 2012, Sareb’s Audit and Remuneration Committees were established. The 
Executive and the Asset-Liability Committees will be created shortly.  
• While the Banco de España will act as the administrative supervisory body of Sareb, there 
will additionally be a Monitoring Committee, outside the structure of Sareb, formed by four 
parties (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, Ministry of Financial Affairs and 
Public Administration, Banco de España and CNMV), to oversee compliance with the general 
objectives for which the company was formed. The Committee may agree to its meetings 
being attended by representatives of other public institutions or national or international 
bodies, as well as to admit permanent observers with full access to the information provided 
to it. The Committee was created at the end of January, and the Secretary General for 
Treasury and Financial Policy was appointed Chair of this Committee. The Ministry for 
Finance and Public Administration, the BdE and the National Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV) are about to appoint their representatives. In its first meeting, the Committee will 
adopt its rules and procedures and agree on invitating external observers. This Committee 
will meet in the future at least once per quarter, as foreseen by the legislation.   
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39. At this stage, the most immediate challenges for Sareb are the following: 
• Adequately reviewing its business plan in order to define the most effective sales 
channels as well as alternative business strategies which may include leases.   
• Ensuring the proper management of its assets by participating banks. Sareb will 
have to monitor closely the performance of those banks and take quick remedial 
actions if these arrangements do not allow the company to extract the maximum 
value from the company. Setting up adequate structures and procedures to carry out 
this monitoring properly and to engage with the banks effectively should be one of 
the top priorities of the company. 
• Completing hiring of the staff and setting-up of the organization, including 
procedures and reporting requirements. In addition, getting a full picture of all the 
assets transferred to Sareb may take some time. 
3.2 BANK RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING  
40. The stress test exercise which was finalised in September 2012 revealed capital 
shortfalls in 10 banks, which had to present recapitalisation plans. These allowed to 
check whether the banks would be able to fill the identified capital shortfall through their 
own means, or if they would need to resort to state aid which would include capital 
injections and the transfer of their real estate related foreclosed assets and their real estate 
development (RED) assets.  
41. The EC adopted the restructuring plans for Group 1 banks on 28 November 
2012, and for Group 2 banks on 20 December 2012. The EC approved the restructuring 
plans for all Group 1 banks, and in the case of Banco de Valencia it approved the State aid 
required for the orderly resolution of the bank through its takeover by CaixaBank. In the 
absence of the takeover, Banco de Valencia would have been wound down, as it was not 
possible to establish a viable business model for the bank on a stand-alone basis. The EC's 
decisions approving the restructuring plans of the group 1 and 2 banks will be published 
once confidentiality issues have been checked by the Spanish authorities and the banks. 
42. Group 1 and Group 2 banks have a combined share of the credit in Spain of just 
above 20%.14 This means that 80% of the system is not constrained by restructuring 
targets. These banks can contribute to picking up credit demand that will not be satisfied by 
the banks under restructuring.  
43. Group 3 banks have been able to cover their capital needs without State aid. 
Ibercaja and Banco Popular have managed to fully comply with the required capital needs 
without public support measures, inter alia, by repurchasing own subordinated debt and 
divesting assets. Banco Popular has been able to raise a significant amount of capital (i.e. 
EUR 2.5 billion) from the market covering most of its capital shortfall of EUR 3.2 billion. 
44. In general, the restructuring plans of Group 1 and 2 banks plans secure the 
banks' solvency, and restore the profitability and liquidity profile over the course of the 
five-year restructuring period. In particular, the focus of the plans is to restore an adequate 
margin structure. This will over time also reinforce the banks' capital position. Another 
focus is on addressing the funding gap and thus reducing the banks' reliance on wholesale 
                                                     
14 This figure excludes banks that will be absorbed by competitors (Banco de Valencia, Caja3 and Caja Penedes): for these the 
new non-aided buyers will be free to decide on the credit policy. 
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funding and allowing them to reduce significantly their reliance on central bank funding. 
This will enable banks to restore sustainable lending patterns towards real economy.  
45. The restructuring plans foresee that banks refocus their business model on retail 
and SME lending in their historical core regions. They will exit from lending to real 
estate development and other overly risky activities and limit their presence in wholesale 
business. They will improve their cost base, by cutting both staff and branches. The plans 
furthermore concentrate banks' deleveraging in the most overleveraged sectors and areas. 
They will not provide new loans for real-estate development and reduce exposure to 
mortgage lending and public sector financing. In contrast, they have continued capability to 
finance SMEs and corporates. The plans will refocus the banks' activities in those regions 
and areas where the banks have a capacity to operate efficiently. The overall path of loan 
deleveraging is not accelerating due to the restructuring plans, if RED loans are excluded. 
46. Furthermore, the restructuring plans address moral hazard, and potential 
distortion of competitions with behavioural commitments on top on the structural 
commitments such as acquisition bans, a ban on aggressive commercial behaviour and 
commitments as regards remuneration of employees. Overall capital needs have been 
reduced by close to EUR 5 billion as a result of capital generating divestitures by the 
affected banks (such as the divestiture by BMN of Caja Penedes).  
47. The restructuring plans, in line with the MoU, ensure that State aid remains 
limited to the minimum amount necessary, so as to minimise the cost to the taxpayers. 
Consequently, not only will former owners of these banks contribute to the needed capital 
injection, but losses will also be allocated to holders of preference shares and subordinated 
debt holders of these banks by implementing both voluntary and, where necessary, 
mandatory subordinated liability exercises (SLEs). The initial estimated amount of capital 
needs has been reduced by almost EUR 13 billion through burden sharing measures. 
48. Specifically, for holders of preference shares and perpetual subordinated debt, 
burden-sharing is being implemented firstly by applying a haircut to the nominal amount 
of the instrument and subsequently through conversion of those securities into equity or 
equity-equivalent instruments. Holders of dated subordinated debt will be given the choice 
between conversion into equity or into a senior debt instrument after taking an appropriate 
haircut. Consequently, as a result of the burden-sharing, there will be no cash outflow from 
banks to the holders of those securities, with the sole exception of the holders of dated 
subordinated debt instruments who decide to convert into new debt securities with the 
maturity matching that of the subordinated debt being exchanged. To that effect, the 
Spanish authorities have introduced legislation to ensure the effectiveness of the 
Subordinated Liability Exercises. 
49. The State aid for those banks consists of capital injections and the transfer of 
problematic assets (see above). For assessing the asset transfer, the EC assessed the 
conditions of transfer of those assets with the help of external experts and concluded that 
they were in line with EU State aid rules. More specifically it verified that the transfer price 
based on the base case value of the stress test exercise, plus a variety of haircuts related to 
the specific conditions of the transfer to Sareb, was in line with the so-called real economic 
value, i.e. the long-term hold to maturity valuation. 
50. The focus is now shifting to monitoring. The EC will actively monitor the 
implementation of the restructuring plans with the help of a monitoring trustee. In addition, 
there will be continuous contacts with the Spanish authorities as well as monitoring reports. 
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4 ENHANCING BANK TRANSPARENCY, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
51. Since mid-November, implementation of the horizontal financial-sector 
conditionality has been further advanced and is close to completion in most areas. The 
reform of the governance of the savings banks, a review of supervisory procedures at Banco 
de España, reforms of the regulatory frameworks governing banks' credit concentration and 
provisioning, and the enhancement of the credit register are still on-going. In all these areas, 
the Spanish authorities have achieved or are very close to achieving compliance with the 
MoU and have made very tangible progress towards major and lasting reforms in these 
areas. An overview on the status of implementing the MoU conditionality is provided in 
Annex 7.2. The financial sector reforms must be speedily finalised in order to allow them to 
enhance the viability of the Spanish banking sector and ensure solid prospects for a 
sustainable economic recovery. 
52. Further progress has been made in fulfilling the conditionality in the area of 
banking supervision and operational independence of BdE (MoU conditions 13 and 14). 
The main findings of the October 2012 report on the internal review of the supervisory 
processes of BdE, which includes inter alia recommendations to enhance on-site 
inspections and the off-site monitoring of credit institutions, were discussed with the 
international partners. Following these discussions, authorities will focus on further 
strengthening the formalisation of supervisory actions and enhance the enforcement of 
provisions related to the rotation of supervisory staff. As regards the strengthening of the 
operational independence of BdE, the agreed proposals to empower the BdE to issue 
binding guidelines ad intra as well as binding replies to queries will be implemented 
through amendments to the Law on the Autonomy of BdE and further changes to the 
solvency regulation. The amendments to the solvency regulation and the Law on the 
Autonomy of the BdE will be part of the legislative changes necessary for the transposition 
of CRD IV. 
53. As regards the reform of the governance of savings banks, further progress was 
achieved since the last review.  The Spanish authorities presented a proposal for a law 
aimed at: (i) clarifying the role of savings banks in their capacity as shareholders of credit 
institutions with a view to eventually reduce their stakes to non-controlling levels; and 
(ii) strengthening fit and proper rules for the governing bodies of savings banks and 
introducing incompatibility requirements regarding the governing bodies of the former 
savings banks and the commercial banks controlled by them. Based on detailed comments 
made by the international partners, Spanish authorities finalised a draft law on this matter 
which was under consultation until 7 February 2013. It is envisaged that the law is approved 
during the second part of the year.  An updated roadmap for the listing of banks which have 
received State aid has been submitted by the Spanish authorities after the approval of 
restructuring plans for Groups 1 and 2. 
54. As regards the obligation on quarterly balance sheet forecasts for banks, a 
reporting template for submitting has been developed. Despite a tight schedule, the first 
submission is foreseen for the second half of April (before the third review mission). The 
balance sheet forecasts will include both the asset and liability side of banks and will be 
extended (with a simplified reporting format) also to banks which did not need state aid 
support or showed a capital shortfall. The balance sheet forecasts done by banks will 
represent a powerful tool for the careful monitoring of the funding sources of banks and of 
the provision of lending to the economy. 
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55. Pursuant to the MoU, the Spanish authorities submitted in mid-January a report 
on the regulatory framework for credit concentration and related party transactions. 
Given that the high lending concentration to the real estate and construction has been one of 
the main vulnerabilities of the banking sector, more forceful policy action to address and 
prevent excessive sectoral concentration appears warranted. The report provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the current regulatory framework for credit concentration and 
related party transactions in Spain and of the new tools to be included in the upcoming 
CRD/CRR IV. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, further progress has been made to 
address the vulnerabilities associated with the high credit concentration on the real estate 
and construction sector, in particular through enhanced disclosure and transparency as well 
as the treatment of the concentration risk in the risk matrix. However, further progress could 
be achieved in this area, especially through the use of capital add-ons under Pillar II. The 
capital surcharges applied by credit institutions the basis of sectoral concentration indexes 
have not been revised as a result of the crisis. Going forward, without prejudice to current 
developments at EU level, more analytical work on the calibration of capital surcharges 
under Pillar II needs to be done in the coming months. 
56. As a result of certain legal or operational constraints (legal ones in the case of 
savings banks) to increase their capital, some credit institutions were incentivised to 
sell regulatory capital instruments (i.e. preference shares) through retail branches to 
non-qualified investors. In light of the MoU requirements (condition 29), Law 9/2012, on 
bank restructuring and resolution established: (i) a set of rules limiting the sale of hybrids to 
retail customers: (ii) several amendments of Law 24/1998, on Securities Market in order to 
increase transparency of instruments different of deposits. Although the MoU condition was 
implemented, the necessary subordinated legislation still needs to be developed. In this 
regard, the Spanish authorities sent a draft Circular to the international partners which is 
under discussion. 
57. The availability of adequate data on credit risk is critical both for micro 
prudential supervision and for an adequate macro prudential analysis (MoU 
condition 30).  Moreover, the information on the credit history of individual borrowers is a 
key element for banks to assess the risk of borrowers. In this regard, the Spanish authorities 
presented in October a complete set of reforms on the credit register. After discussing with 
international partners, a new draft Circular was put in consultation by December. The 
Spanish authorities are currently working on an updated version of the draft Circular and 
the necessary legal amendments in this field. The new regulation is expected to be approved 
in the coming weeks. 
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5 SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC FINANCES AND GROWTH-ENHANCING REFORMS 
5.1 STRENGHTHENING PUBLIC FINANCES 
58. On 10 July 2012, the Council issued a revised excessive deficit procedure (EDP) 
recommendation to Spain, postponing the deadline for correcting the excessive deficit by 
one year to 2014 and fixing new intermediate headline targets of 6.3%, 4.5% and 2.8% of 
GDP for the years 2012-2014. The required structural efforts to achieve these targets were 
2.7 pps., 2.5 pps. and 1.9 pps. of GDP, based on the macro-fiscal outlook at the time when 
the recommendation was issued. The revised EDP recommendation also set a deadline of 
three months for Spain to take effective action towards correcting the excessive deficit.  
59. On 14 November 2012, the Commission concluded in a Communication that 
based on the 2012 Autumn Forecast Spain had taken effective action and that no 
further steps were required under the EDP procedure at that moment. Nominal 
budgetary targets set in the EDP recommendation were likely to be missed, with the 2012 
general government deficit expected to reach around 7% of GDP (not including the costs of 
bank recapitalisation) compared with a 6.3% target. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis 
showed that when correcting for changes in estimated potential output growth and for 
revenue shortfalls, the corrected improvement in the structural balance in 2012 and 2013 
was in line with the EDP recommendation. From a bottom-up perspective, Spain has 
undertaken major discretionary consolidation measures, amounting to around 3½% of GDP 
(not including temporary and one-off measures) in 2012, also confirming the conclusion 
that Spain has taken effective action.  While the 2012 deficit outcome of 6.7% of GDP 
reported by the government at the end of February beated most forecasts, meeting the EDP 
deadline of 2014 appears very challenging and a revision of the EDP deficit path cannot be 
excluded. 
60. The fiscal framework should be strengthened further and the recurrent gap in 
the social security budget needs to be addressed. The implementation of the Budget 
Stability Law implied major progress in terms of more transparent and timely reporting on 
budgetary outcomes at sub-central government level in 2012. However, application of the 
provisions of the law as regards early warning and corrective mechanisms could be made 
more effective and more transparent. Plans for setting up an independent fiscal council 
appear to be still at a preparatory stage. They would need to be stepped up considerably if 
the council is to play an effective role already for the 2014 budgetary exercise, as originally 
announced in the September 2012 reform plan. The recurrent deficit in the social security 
system also needs to be reined in. Plans to introduce a sustainability factor in the pension 
system and to increase the effective retirement age would be an important step in this 
direction, but still need to be adopted.  
5.2 BOOSTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JOB CREATION 
61. Structural reforms that facilitate the correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
and boost growth potential support the objectives of the programme. Large 
accumulated private sector as well as external debt, fast rising public debt and very high 
unemployment are major vulnerabilities. The adjustment of the imbalances begun in 2008 
but has proceeded unevenly and is likely to take time. The bank recapitalisation programme 
should be seen in the context of this on-going adjustment. While the programme stabilises 
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the banking sector (hence supporting its capacity to intermediate financial flows), fostering 
a more competitive economy remains imperative. Structural reforms in factor and product 
markets facilitate the reallocation of resources amongst sectors and increase the capacity of 
economy to undergo the necessary adjustment at a lower economic cost. Reforming 
domestic markets (e.g. for business or professional services) contributes to competitiveness 
by reducing the costs for companies that compete on world markets.  
62. Wage growth is moderating more noticeably, finally responding to the sharp, 
accumulated deterioration in the labour market and to the 2012 reform. Moderating 
wage increase and advances in apparent productivity growth, on the back of labour 
shedding, resulted in a further fall of unit labour costs in 2012. This has helped Spain to 
regain some price competitiveness and hence contributing to the robust export performance. 
The 2012 labour market reform, which has brought about important changes to collective 
bargaining and to labour market regulation, has the potential of strengthening the link 
between wages, the economic cycle, and the firms' position. While it is early to draw 
definitive conclusions, some wage moderation observed lately and the increase in objective 
dismissals suggest that the reform might be starting to have an impact. Duality in the labour 
market remains, however, so far largely unchanged. The gravity of the labour market 
situation requires continuous monitoring and review of the impact of the reform. The 
Spanish authorities committed to prepare a first assessment of the reform by 2013-Q1. It 
should review the impact on wage dynamics, labour market segmentation and 
employability.  
63. While the excessive reliance on employment subsidies has been partially 
addressed with the 2012 reform, the integration of passive and active labour market 
policies remains a challenge. These policies are necessary complement to the labour 
market reform. Spending on training, labour market integration and professional 
reorientation is still relatively low. The authorities are preparing an evaluation of active 
labour market policies (2013-Q1) which will serve as a basis to identify good practices and 
eventual budget reallocation. Public Employment Services need to be modernised to 
provide effective counselling and assistance to those looking for jobs. Furthermore, the 
coordination between national and regional public employment services needs to be 
enhanced. Skills mismatches and low labour market relevance of education and training 
contribute to the high youth unemployment rate. The labour market reform amended the 
training and apprenticeship contracts, and foundations were set to launch a dual vocational 
training system, which should, in the medium-term, facilitate work-based training and 
enable a better integration and matching of the changing needs of the labour market. The 
Law on the Quality of Education, currently under discussion, is due to be adopted in 2013-
Q1. Its implementation will rely largely on the regions.  
64. There has been progress in improving the efficiency of the tax system. The tax-to-
GDP ratio as well as VAT revenue and revenue from environmental taxes in Spain are 
among the lowest in the EU. Spain also has a high rate of home-ownership, which has been 
encouraged by favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. As already discussed 
in the First Review report15, some recent measures improve the efficiency of the tax system. 
These include an increase of VAT rates and a wider scope of application of the standard 
rate as well as measures aimed at ensuring less tax-induced bias towards indebtedness and 
home-ownership. However, there is scope to further limit the application of different 
reduced rates for VAT and to increase environmental taxes, most notably on fuel.  
                                                     
15 DG ECFIN Occasional Paper No 121, November 2012. 
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65. Progress in delivering of some key product and services market reforms has been 
slow. The draft law on market unity was adopted by the Council of Ministers at the end of 
January (see below), whereas a series of fiscal incentives to foster entrepreneurship and to 
hire young unemployed workers were adopted at the end of February. However, a draft law 
on professional services has not yet been finalised. This important law aims to open up 
reserved activities in selected professions, lift registration obligations in professional bodies 
(with some exceptions) and simplify licensing requirements for the access to and the 
exercise of professional activities across regions.  
66. The draft law on market unity was adopted at the end of January. The authorities 
estimate that this reform will add some 1.5 pps. to GDP over a ten year period following its 
adoption. These estimations are broadly aligned with the positive effects on GDP growth 
predicated from reforms reducing administrative burdens. The draft law has the potential to 
lift many hurdles to economic activity. The implementation of the law will hinge upon the 
elimination of inconsistencies with sector and regional specific legislation (within a six 
months' deadline) and enhanced administrative cooperation among the State, the regions 
and the local authorities. The reinforcement of the Spanish competition authority's 
watchdog role in market-unity related issues and the setting up of a response mechanism to 
individuals' complaints on hurdles to the single market will also be crucial. It is important 
that degree of ambition of the law is not reduced during the legislative process.  
67. The "electricity tariff deficit" implies a considerable contingent liability for the 
budget as well as non-negligible macroeconomic risks. In 2012, the deficit (i.e. the gap 
between regulated 'access tariffs' paid by consumers and various regulated costs - including 
distribution costs and subsidies for renewable energy production) reached over 
EUR 5 billion (around 0.5% of GDP), exceeding the envisaged level of EUR 1.5 billion by 
a wide margin. The slippage was due to higher than expected premiums to renewable 
energy sources, drop in demand for electricity, and suspension of financing of the extra-
peninsular compensation by the state budget. The cumulative total of the tariff deficit 
amounts to EUR 29 billion. Some new measures were recently adopted to contain the 
deficit in the future. New taxes on energy production introduced in December 2012 should 
generate EUR 3 billion in 2013. In addition, revising the annual adjustment of regulated 
costs (core inflation instead of CPI) and simplifying the system of support to renewable 
energy sources could generate another EUR 0.6 billion of savings a year. Despite these 
measures the electricity tariff deficit is still expected to be sizeable in 2013, leading the 
authorities to propose in February an extraordinary credit from the state budget of 
EUR 2.2 billion.  
68. The measures promoting non-bank intermediation which were announced in 
November 2012 remain to be fully implemented. These measures, including enhanced 
capital market access for SMEs and venture capital financing, may contribute to improve 
the access of SMEs to financing in a context of overall bank deleveraging (see also the First 
Review report). 
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6 ANNEXES 
6.1 DELEVERAGING IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
6.1.1 Summary 
69. Ensuring adequate access to funding represents a precondition for a viable 
banking sector that could provide the financial resources needed for the structural 
reallocation of production factors needed in the Spanish economy. Even though funding 
strains have eased and non-viable banks are being restructured, there have been both 
academic and policy discussions regarding the effects of financial sector deleveraging on 
economic growth.  
70. Three main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in this section. First, a 
one-size-fit-all quantitative analysis is insufficient to estimate the economic impact of bank 
deleveraging. Second, bank deleveraging supports structural adjustment and sustainable 
economic growth if confined to sectors and companies that grew untenably in the preceding 
boom. Third, judging by the recent and current pace of debt reduction in the economy, 
deleveraging does not appear excessive, given the formidable task ahead of Spain to correct 
a significant amount of private and public sector indebtedness. Nevertheless, the process 
needs to be carefully monitored in order to avoid a credit crunch for the viable companies 
that will support the economic recovery.  
71. When assessing the economic impact of bank deleveraging in Spain, a number of 
considerations need to be taken into account: 
• There is a structural need to realign the economy away from construction and 
housing, where overinvestment occurred during the boom, in order for the 
economy to return to growth and allow expansion in more dynamic economic 
sectors. A large part of the credit contraction is related to the downsizing of the 
construction and RED sectors and the building up of impairment allowances. 
• It is difficult to disentangle the contribution of supply and demand factors to 
the provision of new lending. Most likely demand factors weigh most heavily at 
the current juncture, although supply conditions have yet to improve in line with 
the recent favourable developments in the banking sector. 
• Banks were induced to acknowledge bad debts and clean up their balance 
sheets, as a prerequisite for restoring confidence in the financial sector and allow 
credit to flow to solvent clients. However, the recessionary environment weakens 
the credit demand and renders the selection of viable projects very difficult; 
• The restructuring plans for State-aided banks are likely to have limited 
adverse effects on the provision of credit, as they focus on continued lending in 
the banks' core markets and especially to SMEs and households. The sectors 
targeted for reduction are precisely those that need to structurally shrink;  
• Adjustment and rebalancing in the real economy can be promoted via: 
structural reforms that reduce price rigidities and the impact of negative nominal 
credit growth on the real economy; improvement in the business environment in 
order to encourage development of new viable businesses; and fiscal consolidation 
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to restore investor confidence, speed up the liquidation of non-viable business and 
increase domestic savings. 
6.1.2 Bank leverage in Spain 
72. This sub-section looks at bank leverage and its components by making use of two 
complementary indicators: i) the leverage ratio (assets/equity), and ii) the loan/deposit ratio, 
in order to also capture bank reliance on wholesale funding. 
73. The leverage ratio for the Spanish banking system is currently lower than the 
euro area average. During the boom period it increased from 12 to 16, but has thereafter 
declined to about 9 (see Graph 11). During the boom both total assets and equity grew. 
Thereafter, a process of deleveraging started via a slowdown in the growth of assets at the 
same time that the growth of equity accelerated. In absolute terms, bank assets grew by a 
modest 10% from late 2008 to late 2012, while equity almost doubled during the same 
period. The new equity came from three main sources: i) capital raising, ii) retained 
earnings, and iii) public capital. Increases in equity, both private and public, have thus 
played a major role in the recent reduction of leverage in the Spanish banking sector. 
 
Graph 11: Leverage ratio and its components (in terms of outstanding volumes) 
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Note: Leverage ratio is computed as total assets to equity. A: Crisis outbreak; B: Lehman Brothers; C: First Greek programme; 
D: Sovereign crisis contagion; E: Greek PSI debt exchange. Last available data: November 2012. 
Source: ECB and own calculations 
74. By nature, the annual change of the leverage ratio, i.e. the net change of assets 
and equity, is more volatile and also pro-cyclical. While the leverage ratio of Spanish 
banks was a modest 13 in 2006, the high growth rate of the leverage ratio implied a much 
higher marginal leverage (see Graph 12). Between 2006 and 2008, the implied leverage of 
new operations of Spanish banks skyrocketed as Spanish banks expanded their balance 
sheets rapidly (up to EUR 450 billion a year) with limited backing of new equity. To some 
extent the increase in both assets and equity could probably be explained by unrealised 
capital gains on trading and assets held available for sale.  
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Graph 12: Leverage ratio and its components (in terms of recent activity: annual flows) 
Leverage components in Spain 
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Note: The leverage ratio is computed as total assets to equity. Annual flows are computed as the sum of flows of twelve 
consecutive months. A: Crisis outbreak; B: Lehman Brothers; C: First Greek programme; D: Sovereign crisis contagion; E: Greek 
PSI debt exchange. Last available data: November 2012. 
Source: ECB and own calculations 
The loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio indicates the proportion of loans financed by client 
deposits. In the mid-2000s, the ratio was around 1.25 (see Graph 13). This means that about 
a quarter of outstanding loans were financed by sources other than deposits. With the 
outbreak of the crisis, this ratio declined to around 1.1. Loans are of course not the only 
asset type a bank needs to fund. However, the LTD ratio is still a useful measure as loans 
tend to less liquid, i.e. harder to sell, than many other asset types. They should ideally then 
be backed by stable funding.  
 
Graph 13: Loans and deposits (in terms of outstanding volumes) 
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Note:  A: Crisis outbreak; B: Lehman Brothers; C: First Greek programme; D: Sovereign crisis contagion; E: Greek PSI debt 
exchange. Last available data: November 2012. 
Source: ECB and own calculations 
75. Between August 2011 and July 2012, deposits in Spanish banks declined by 
EUR 210 billion, or about 12%, which also led to a spike in the LTD ratio. This was to 
a great degree driven by a shift by depositors to other bank products (i.e. commercial papers 
for retail consumers) and did in fact not represent an outflow from the Spanish banking 
system. The trend has corrected itself after August 2012, but it does render the LTD ratio 
less valuable as a measure currently as it overstates the reliance on non-core funding. The 
sharp increase in the ratio during the height of the boom further indicates that, on the 
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margin, the expansion in lending was primarily funded by non-core funding (i.e. 
wholesale). 
6.1.3 The Spanish crisis and economy wide deleveraging 
Unbalanced growth during the boom 
76. Excessive bank credit expansion following a period of low interest rates and lax 
financial sector regulations was probably the most important contributor to the 
economic and real estate boom in Spain. Following the introduction of the euro, the 
country's risk premium virtually disappeared and, Spanish interest rates fell sharply16. At 
the same time, capital inflows increased and as a result, the external financing constraint for 
the Spanish economy almost disappeared. 
77. This sudden drop in interest rates falsified the interest rate signal in the 
economy that is formed on the basis of individual time preferences and misled businesses 
into believing that enough real savings existed in the economy (or could be imported) in 
order to lengthen the structure of production towards more capital intensive sectors. Indeed, 
part of the inflow of financial resources was used to increase the capital intensity of the 
Spanish economy, with investment in equipment increasing its weight in GDP by 1.4 %-
points between 1995 and 2007, twice the euro area average. In addition, an important share 
of the external financial resources went to the non-tradable sector, and more specifically to 
construction and real estate activities, implying a large increase in the indebtedness of 
households and non-financial corporates. The significant increase of external financing was, 
unavoidably, accompanied by an increasing current account deficit. 
78. Rapid credit growth to the private sector resulted in over-indebted households 
and firms, with debt at the peak of 86% and 140 % of GDP in 2010, respectively17. 
Private sector debt almost doubled between 2000 and 2008 and increased by ca. 100% of 
GDP. This was not compensated by the decline in public indebtedness of about 24% of 
GDP over the same period. In parallel, a house price bubble developed. During the 11 years 
preceding the relative house price peak in 2007Q3, nominal house prices grew at an average 
pace of 11.4% per year, amounting to a cumulated growth of 232%. In parallel, investment 
in the construction sector grew by 6% per year on average. 
79. Eventually, the new structure of production skewed towards capital intensive 
activities and the non-tradable sectors was not sustainable. There was simply neither a 
genuine fall in time preferences, nor an increase in savings in Spain or in the euro area in 
general to allow for a successful completion of the projects undertaken and the repayment 
of the bank credit. The increase in interest rates following policy rate setting by central 
banks and incorporation of anticipated inflation likely triggered the unavoidable market 
correction.  
The crisis and its deleveraging pressures 
80. Since the beginning of 2008, the economy went through a rebalancing phase, 
cushioned by a significant fiscal relaxation during 2009-2011. First, a correction has 
taken place in the construction sector, which is already back at pre-boom levels after 
                                                     
16 Taking as reference, the one-year interbank interest rate was 10% in 1995 and 4% in 1998. 
17 For a more detailed analysis, please see the Commission Staff Working Document: In-depth review for Spain, In accordance 
with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
  
- 32 - 
 
plummeting in 2009 and 2010. Second, despite significant adjustment in house prices since 
their peak (of about -30%), their decline has recently accelerated to above 15% y-o-y in the 
third quarter of 2012 and further adjustment is to be expected. And third, private sector 
deleveraging started only in 2010 and has gained speed as of 2012 when the Spanish 
economy dived into its second recession in the last four years.  Private sector deleveraging 
started relatively late in the crisis18 and was slow at about 15% of GDP from its peak in 
2010 to mid-2012, mostly due to a fall in non-financial corporation debt. In the meantime, 
public sector indebtedness grew constantly since 2008, reaching around 86% of GDP in 
2012 according to the EC Autumn Forecast. This represents an increase of about 45% of 
GDP over the period, which means that leverage has actually increased in the total economy 
since the beginning of the crisis (see Graph 7 on the evolution of gross debt). A gradual 
decline in private debt is in line with historical experience showing that deleveraging 
processes take considerable time and imply large output losses, particularly when 
accompanied by banking and housing crises19. 
81. The necessary unwinding of the imbalances built-up during the boom is affecting 
economic activity and financial stability in the short-term. Credit to the private sector 
has contracted as the banking sector has been restructured and cleaned up of legacy assets. 
More importantly, credit demand has also been withheld due to the current economic 
uncertainty and the recessionary environment. Anecdotal evidence shows that recently the 
demand for credit by companies relates more to working capital rather than investment. 
Both firms and households are using their income and economic buffers to reduce debt. As 
the misallocation of resources in the boom is gradually unwound, a liquidation of bad 
investments also takes place. This implies an adjustment in both the real economy and the 
financial sector via a credit correction. The balance sheets of the non-financial private 
sector and of the financial one can be seen as two sides of one coin. As borrowers run into 
financial difficulties and some go bankrupt, the write-down of liabilities in the non-financial 
sector is accompanied by impairment of assets and shrinking balance sheets in the financial 
sector.  
82. Deleveraging is necessary in the sectors that over expanded in the boom in order 
to allow the economy to adjust and grow again in a sustainable manner. As non-viable 
firms leave the market, factors of production are freed to allow the recovery in the viable 
part of the economy. The increase in indebtedness of non-financial corporations was to a 
large extent driven by the real estate boom. During the years of the strongest credit growth 
to NFC, 2004-2008, credit to construction and real estate activities accounted for 54% of 
overall credit growth. If bank debt of construction and real estate sectors is excluded, the 
overall leverage ratio for NFC decreases by about half from 132% to 62% of GDP (Q2 
2012)20.  While deleveraging is needed in the non-viable part of the economy, it is critical to 
ensure credit provision to businesses that are catering to meet the new market demand 
structure. Therefore, in order to assess whether the speed of deleveraging in the economy is 
excessive, one also needs to look into the lending dynamics in the economy and access to 
                                                     
18 During 2008 to 2010 private debt kept increasing by about 7% of GDP, also due to the decline in nominal GDP over the period. 
19 Countries with boom-bust credit cycles typically have deep recessions and sluggish recoveries, with GDP remaining 9-10% 
below the pre-crisis trend in the next 5-10 years (IMF WEO, Sept 2009). Deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing 
crisis took 5½ years on average across high-income OECD economies and reduced private debt-to-GDP ratios by 20 pps. If 
they were accompanied by a banking crisis, they took 7 years, the reduction in debt to GDP was 30 pps on average and the 
recovery in GDP was considerably slower (see e.g. Aspachs-Bracons, et al., 2011). Evidence presented by IMF (2012a) 
indicates that housing crises, which are preceded by a build-up of household debt, result in a fall in real private consumption 
and GDP of 4%, on average, over a 5-year period. In the absence of a banking crisis the decline in private consumption is 
limited to 2%. 
20 For a more detailed analysis of private sector indebtedness, please see chapter 3 of the Commission Staff Working Document: 
In-depth review for Spain, In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
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credit by viable sectors. Such an analysis needs to be done in a more granular way and on a 
sectorial basis in order to be meaningful.  
83. A recent study by the Bank of Spain21 looks at the evolution of corporate 
indebtedness between 2007 and 2011 at firm level and by sector. The results show that 
companies and sectors that were highly indebted at the onset of the crisis have reduced debt 
faster than the average, while firms that started from a low level of debt have actually 
increased their leverage over the period. The pattern has been similar for large companies 
and SMEs. 
What drives the contraction in credit? 
84. The evolution of lending in Spain should be gauged against the need for 
deleveraging in certain parts of the economy and the need to write-off the legacy assets 
incurred during the boom. Therefore the underlying trends in the evolution of the stock of 
credit for the private resident sector needs to be corrected for certain developments: 
85. First, the increases in impairment allowances due to increasing amounts of bad 
loans play a predominant role in the recent decline in the stock of credit to the private 
non-MFI borrowers. During the year prior to November 2012, about three-quarters of the 
decline (around EUR 77 billion) are explained by the impairment of bad debts on banks’ 
balance sheets. Thus, the gross stock of credit to private non-MFI borrowers went down by  
1.2% y-o-y as of November 2012 instead of a decline of 5.5% in the stock of net lending. 
This means that most of the contraction in credit does not necessarily affect new lending 
flows in the economy, but it is due to the writing off of bad debts, affecting the lending to 
non-viable borrowers. 
86. Second, there is a difference in credit dynamics among various economic sectors 
in the economy.  Total credit to domestic residents (non-MFI) was declining at 4.8% y-o-y 
in the third quarter of 201222. At the same time, if one leaves out the construction and real 
estate sectors where the need for correction is the highest, credit to the rest of the economy 
was declining at a more moderate 3.5% y-o-y.  
87. Third, one needs to look at the total amount of credit in the economy and not 
only at the one provided by the domestic banking sector, as the latter is under 
pressure to deleverage and has adopted more prudent credit standards. For example, 
domestic credit to NFC was declining at 8% y-o-y as of December 2012, whereas external 
loans declined by only 0.5% y-o-y and corporate bonds issued increased by 12.5% y-o-y. 
Overall, the decline in total credit to non-financial corporates was thus 5.2% y-o-y instead 
of 8%.  
88. If one takes into account all these effects it is less obvious whether the speed of 
deleveraging is excessive or it just reflects the healthy process of economic adjustment 
away from unsustainable economic activities. It also seems that, so far, the decline in the 
stock of credit is not mainly driven by constrained new lending to solvent businesses. 
Disentangling the contribution of demand and supply factors as regards new lending is 
always very difficult. However, there are several developments (presented below) which 
point to the fact that at the current juncture, demand related factors outweigh the supply-
side ones, despite the fact that supply conditions have not improved in line with banking 
sector fundamentals. 
                                                     
21 see BdE Economic Bulletin, January 2013. 
22 Granular data is only available up to September 2012. 
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89. The main constraints to the provision of credit by the domestic banking sector 
related to their capitalisation and access to funding have started to ease in recent 
months. They should start translating into an improved credit market if the macro-
economic conditions allow for it. In particular, the financing concerns of banks in the euro 
area were to large extent addressed by the Eurosystem's LTRO's and other liquidity 
providing measures. As of December, the reliance of Spanish banks on net borrowing from 
the Eurosystem declined to EUR 313 billion from a record EUR 389 billion in August. 
Together with other euro area banks, the Spanish MFIs also repaid early a significant 
amount of the LTRO’s in January 2013. The recent recapitalisation of Spanish banks under 
the banking programme has increased overall capital levels in the system. Even though the 
profitability of banks is still under pressure due to the sustained provisioning effort and their 
capital buffers above the required levels are not that high, the risk-weighted assets of 
Spanish banks are much above the levels of their international peers, pointing to more 
comfortable capital levels in absolute terms. 
90. According to the ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS), Spanish banks have 
tightened their lending conditions during the crisis, but in the second half of 2012 no 
further tightening has been reported (see Graph 14). For several quarters in 2007, 2008 
and 2009, more than 80% of Spanish banks tightened credit standards. Although banks 
maintain high credit standards they do not expect that they will resume a net tightening of 
credit standards in the coming quarter.  
 
Graph 14: Changes in credit standards applied to the approval of loans and credit lines 
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Source: ECB 
Since the onset of the crisis, lending rates for Spanish non-financial corporates, and 
especially for SMEs, have on average been higher than the euro area average. 
Although it bears witness to a certain degree of fragmentation of euro area financial 
markets, it also reflects higher risk premia that investors perceive relative to individual 
economies. It is therefore encouraging that recent data from the ECB indicate a declining 
trend in interest rates on smaller loans, i.e. those most relevant to SMEs (see Graph 15). 
Average interest rates on new loans to non-financial corporates of smaller than 
EUR 1 million (maturity of 1-5 years) declined by 135bp between July and December 2012. 
One possible interpretation is that the lower funding costs experienced by Spanish banks 
have started to filter through to lending rates. For large Spanish companies, although 
  
- 35 - 
 
increasing, lending rates are closer to the euro area average, probably reflecting their ability 
to access credit also outside Spain or diversify their funding on capital markets.  
 
Graph 15: Monthly average MFI lending rates 
to NFCs 
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91. The supply of credit to finance a large increase in public deficits and debt since 
the beginning of the crisis have in part substituted new lending to the private viable 
sector. New lending worth about EUR 110 billion was granted by Spanish banks to the 
government from November 2011 to November 2012. 
92. As regards the demand for credit, uncertainties about the role of the euro in the 
periphery, about the overall public debt sustainability and about the unfinished 
economic adjustment that may lead to a wave of bankruptcies make businessmen 
cautious about investing until the liquidation process is over. 
93. Accordingly, Spanish banks also report a continuous fall in the demand of loans 
by households and enterprises (see Graph 16). Moreover, the decline in demand is 
expected to continue in the next quarter with the exception for loans for house purchases. 
 
Graph 16: Changes in the demand of loans and credit lines 
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94. Several companies enjoyed good earnings in previous years and are cash rich, 
being adverse to investment in an uncertain environment and waiting for prices to fall 
further (while reducing their indebtedness). The financial assets of non-financial 
corporates (other than shares) declined only marginally by about EUR 36 billion from June 
2011 to June 2012, but the decline in their financial liabilities was close to EUR 400 billion 
over the same period. 
95. Hernando and Villanueva (2012)23 use information of Spanish banks' balance 
sheets (1995-2009) to try to isolate credit supply factors by using the variation in 
capital growth associated to the bank-specific historical exposure to real estate. They 
find that the deterioration of banks’ capital position has had only a limited negative impact 
on the supply of loans to non-construction firms. The authors conclude that the small 
magnitude of credit supply factor impact may be explained by the weakness of loan demand 
in a context of a deep recession. 
6.1.4 Impact of the banking sector programme 
96. The impact of the banking sector programme on the Spanish economy is 
predominantly positive, reinforcing two healthy trends. On one hand, the cleaning up of 
bank balance sheets of problematic real estate related assets accelerates deleveraging in the 
non-viable economy and, on the other hand, it offers in return to banks capital and liquid 
securities that can be used to extend new lending to the viable economy. In addition, the 
return in investor confidence facilitates the banking sector’s access to external and domestic 
funding and allows it to place new equity issues to consolidate its capital base. 
97. The amount of new capital injected in the banks by FROB (about 
EUR 39 billion) can be gradually used for new lending and represents a non-negligible 
2.3% of the entire Spanish stock of credit that in turn can be gradually multiplied 
several times. At the same time, the ESM securities received by the banks are contributing 
to significantly easing the liquidity constraints for these banks and for the money market in 
general. Anecdotal evidence shows that Spanish banks are entering into repo operations by 
using the ESM bonds in transactions with foreign banks, thus improving the liquidity of 
money markets and reducing the transaction costs. Another liquidity relief comes from the 
Sareb securities received by the Group 1 banks (ca. EUR 37 billion) in return for the 
transfer of RED assets. The contraction in the overall stock of credit in the economy due to 
the transfer of the legacy RED assets to Sareb represents primarily an accounting effect 
without harming the flow of new credit in the economy. 
Financial Program restructuring plans 
98. The restructuring plans aim at ensuring the banks' return to viability and to 
sustainable lending. This means reducing risk by redesigning banks' business models 
around the activities and areas where their competitive strength resides: retail lending and 
core regions. Banks are expected to withdraw from lending to over-leveraged parts of the 
economy (e.g. real estate development) and focus on lending to productive parts of the 
economy (businesses). The essence of the downsizing will relate to areas linked to the real 
estate bubble such as RED loans where there will be no new production. Lending to the 
public sector and for house purchases will also decline. In contrast, loans to the business 
                                                     
23 Hernando, Ignacio and Villanueva, Ernesto, The Recent Slowdown of Bank Lending in Spain: Are Supply-Side Factors 
Relevant? (24 January 2012). Banco de Espana Working Paper No. 1206.  
 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991106 
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sector, corporates and SMEs, will not be affected. This economic sector is expected to 
contribute most to restoring competitiveness of the Spanish economy in the coming years. 
99. The situation for Spanish banks before the programme was one of investor 
mistrust towards the whole sector, given the uncertainty related to the size and 
location of expected losses. However, there was also a conviction among international 
partners that the major part of the system remained healthy but deeply affected by the 
problems of a few banks. Overall, state aided banks account for only 21% of the total 
Spanish banking system in terms of assets and 28% in terms of lending to customers 
(respectively 17% and 22% after the transfer of assets to Sareb). Group 1 banks account for 
only about 8% of lending to corporations and SMEs and 19% of lending to residential 
mortgages. Group 2 banks account for about 4% of lending to corporations and SMEs and 
8% of lending to residential mortgages. Focusing on “stand-alone banks”, i.e. not taken over 
by competitors, they account for about 22% in terms of loans to the non-financial sector. 
100. The reduction of the banks' balance sheet according to the  restructuring plans 
is in the range of 60% or more for Group 124 banks and about 30% for Group 2 banks over 
2010 (the peak of the boom) and 2017. This seems like a very large drop, but if one takes as 
starting point the year 2012, then the reduction in the banks' balance sheets is less than 40% 
for Group 1 and about 20% for Group 2. 
101. According to the approved restructuring plans, the bulk of the reduction in 
credit to private sector will be in the real estate and development portfolio where no 
new production will be done. As Spain is rebalancing following the burst of the housing 
and asset bubble, deleveraging and balance sheet repair in these sectors are unavoidable part 
of the adjustment. It also has to be kept in mind that much of the reduction in the RED 
sector is not imposed deleveraging, but a transfer of assets to the AMC.  Exposure of 
Spanish banks to RED portfolio was one of the main reasons for the problems currently 
facing parts of the banking sector. Effectively dealing with remaining RED stock, especially 
when it is already problematic, is one of the objectives of the financial sector programme 
for Spain. 
102. In the core regions, the restructuring plans foresee lending to corporates and 
SMEs without restrictions. For instance, Bankia (see Box 4) will keep all its SMEs 
network and plans to strengthen in this sector throughout its restructuring period.  
103. Importantly, the restructuring plans approved by the EC changed the pattern of 
deleveraging: until 2012, loan reductions were largely focused on business loans (SMEs 
and large corporate), while RED loans even increased, partially as a result of the accounting 
effects of reclassification. However, from 2012 onwards, the reduction is focused on RED 
loans, whereas business loans remain stable. Thus, the foreseen reduction in total lending 
for Group 1 and Group 2 banks amounts to about 12% annually over 2012-2016, but it 
declines to only around 5% if RED loans are excluded. In a similar way, consumer loans are 
only expected to decline by about 3% annually on average.  
104. By contrast, the stock of RED loans will be reduced almost to zero, which is 
economically sensible given its inadequate quality and the problems with the poor judgment 
in origination of such loans during the boom period. As regards loans for large corporates, 
they can be more easily substituted by the remaining 80% of the banking sector as these 
clients are able to switch borrowing if they are viable. However, if they are not viable and if 
                                                     
24 Without Banco de Valencia which will be sold to and fully integrated into CaixaBank 
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banks reduce their exposure to them and stop supporting "zombie" companies, economic 
efficiency can only grow. 
Box 4: Main features of the restructuring plans for BFA/Bankia 
BFA/Bankia will be split into a core (steady bank) unit and legacy unit, within the same entity. 
The steady bank will include the existing Steady Bank Unit will form the basis of a sound and 
viable bank. It will include the existing retail, SME and public sector banking businesses of the 
BFA Group that are located in its so-called core areas, as well as those of a limited number of 
branches in selected main economic centres of other Spanish regions. The Legacy Unit will 
include the businesses, assets and liabilities that will be discontinued and will be sold, closed or 
held to maturity. The BFA Group will cease any new business in loans in a number of restricted 
activities such as REDs, loans outside the core regions and outside the branches in selected 
presence in other parts of the country and wholesale activities, refocusing on retail banking 
activities and SME business banking services. There will be additional branch and staff 
adjustments in its branch network and central services. Those measures involve a reduction 
between 2012 and 2017 of 39% in branches and 33% in staff. 
The restructuring plans are much more lenient with the viable part of the bank, which means 
that some of the negative effects of the restructuring of the bank on the economy will be 
minimized. The Steady Bank will undergo a reduction of only 4% in loans and assets from 2012 
and 2017. Residential mortgage lending is projected to decrease by around EUR 15 billion, 
compensated by credit to SMEs going up by the same amount. Basically the bank's exposure to 
the SME sector will increase significantly by about one third for the entire entity. The reduction 
of 24% in branches and 24% in staff between 2012 and 2017 in the Steady Bank will be much 
lower than for the entire group. 
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6.2 MAIN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
1995-
1999
2000-
2004
2005-
2008
2009 2010 2011 2012
(e) 
2013
(f) 
Core indicators
GDP grow th rate 3.7 3.6 3.0 - 3.7 - 0.3 0.4 - 1.4 - 1.4 
Private consumption (annual % change) 3.5 3.7 2.8 - 3.8 0.7 - 1.0 - 1.9 - 2.7 
Public consumption (annual % change) 2.7 5.0 5.4 3.7 1.5 - 0.5 - 4.1 - 5.4 
HICP (annual % change) 2.8 3.2 3.5 - 0.2 2.0 3.1 2.4 1.7
Domestic demand incl. stocks 4.2 4.3 3.6 - 6.6 - 0.6 - 1.9 - 3.8 - 4.0 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 17.2 11.2 9.3 18.0 20.1 21.7 25.0 26.9
Gross f ixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.5 26.7 29.8 23.6 22.3 21.1 19.3 17.9
Gross national saving (% of GDP) 22.0 22.6 21.1 19.2 18.4 17.8 17.9 19.4
General Government (% of GDP)
Balance - 4.2 - 0.4 0.3 - 11.2 - 9.7 - 9.4 - 10.2 - 6.7 
Gross debt 64.7 52.5 39.8 53.9 61.5 69.3 88.4 95.8
Interest expenditure 4.6 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.5
Households
Households saving rate 13.2 11.3 11.3 17.8 13.1 11.0 8.3 8.4
Rest of the world (% of GDP)
Trade balance - 0.1 - 2.8 - 6.0 - 1.9 - 2.2 - 0.8 0.8 3.6
Trade balance, goods - 3.3 - 5.7 - 8.1 - 4.0 - 4.6 - 3.8 - 2.6 - 0.4 
Trade balance, services 3.2 2.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.0 3.4 4.1
Current account balance - 0.8 - 4.4 - 9.0 - 4.8 - 4.4 - 3.7 - 1.9 1.0
Net f inancial assets - 27.0 - 39.7 - 70.1 - 91.9 - 86.4 - 89.3 - 89.7 n.a.
Net international investment position - 26.9 - 41.3 - 69.7 - 93.7 - 88.9 - 91.8 - 90.5 n.a.
Competitiveness (index, 2005=100)
Real effective exchange rate relative to 
the rest of the euro area
91.4 95.8 104.1 104.9 103.4 100.8 96.1 94.5
Real effective exchange rate relative to 
the rest of the European Union
93.7 95.3 103.8 107.7 105.2 102.5 96.8 95.6
Real effective exchange rate relative to 
the rest of 36 industrialised countries
92.4 92.7 104.6 109.0 104.6 102.3 95.6 95.7
Banking sector
Assets (% of GDP) 173.7 194.9 274.5 328.9 330.9 340.5 341.6 n.a.
Private domestic credit (y-o-y %) 11.8 14.7 18.9 - 1.6 0.8 - 3.2 - 10.0 n.a.
Non-performing loans (NPLs), total 3.3 1.1 1.5 5.1 5.8 7.8 10.4 n.a.
NPLs, productive activities n.a. 1.2 1.5 6.2 8.1 11.6 16.6 n.a.
 " of w hich, construction, and n.a. 1.0 1.7 8.5 12.1 18.2 26.4 n.a.
 " real estate activities n.a. 0.6 1.8 10.1 14.0 21.4 30.3 n.a.
NPLs, residential mortgages n.a. 0.4 1.0 2.9 2.6 3.1 4.0 n.a.
Tier 1 ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.3 9.6 10.5 9.6 n.a.
Interest rates
10 year spread vis-à-vis the Bund 2.1 0.1 0.2 1.0 2.0 3.9 5.5 4.8
CDS 5 year n.a. n.a. n.a. 92.9 203.4 318.1 427.2 262.0  
(e) 2012 estimate or latest available data 
(f) 2013: forecast or latest available data 
Sources: Ameco, BdE, ECB, Eurostat, Thomson Reuters EcoWin. 
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6.3 TABLE ON THE STATUS OF MOU CONDITIONALITY 
Measure Date Status 
1. Provide data needed for monitoring the entire 
banking sector and of banks of specific interest due to 
their systemic nature or condition (Annex 1). 
Regularly 
throughout the 
programme, 
starting end-
July 
Improvements 
ongoing 
2. Prepare restructuring or resolution plans with the EC 
for Group 1 banks, to be finalised in light of the 
Stress Tests results in time to allow their approval by 
the Commission in November. 
July 2012 - mid 
August 
Implemented – 
plans adopted on 
28 November 2012 
3. Finalise the proposal for enhancement and 
harmonisation of disclosure requirements for all 
credit institutions on key areas of the portfolios such 
as restructured and refinanced loans and sectorial 
concentration. 
End-July 2012 Implemented 
BdE Circular 
6/2012 
4. Provide information required for the Stress Test to 
the consultant, including the results of the asset 
quality review. 
Mid-August 
2012 
Implemented 
5. Introduce legislation to introduce the effectiveness of 
SLEs, including allowing for mandatory SLEs. 
End-August 
2012 
Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
6. Upgrade of the bank resolution framework, i.e. 
strengthen the resolution powers of the FROB and 
FGD. 
End-August 
2012 
Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
7. Prepare a comprehensive blueprint and legislative 
framework for the establishment and functioning of 
the AMC. 
End-August 
2012 
Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
8. Complete bank-by-bank stress test (Stress Test). Second half of 
September 
2012 
Implemented 
9. Finalise a regulatory proposal on enhancing 
transparency of banks  
End September 
2012 
Implemented 
BdE Circular 
6/2012 
10. Banks with significant capital shortfalls will conduct 
Subordinated Liability Exercises (SLEs). 
before capital 
injections in 
Oct./Dec. 2012 
Decisions 
stipulating SLEs 
adopted 
11. Banks to draw up recapitalisation plans to indicate 
how capital shortfalls will be filled. 
Early-October 
2012 
Implemented  
12. Present restructuring or resolution plans to the EC for 
Group 2 banks. 
October 2012 Implemented 
13. Identify possibilities to further enhance the areas in 
which the BdE can issue binding guidelines or 
interpretations without regulatory empowerment. 
End-October 
2012 
Implemented 
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Measure Date Status 
14. Conduct an internal review of supervisory and 
decision-making processes. Propose changes in 
procedures in order to guarantee timely adoption of 
remedial actions for addressing problems detected at 
an early stage by on-site inspection teams. Ensure 
that macro-prudential supervision will properly feed 
into the micro supervision process and adequate 
policy responses. 
End-October 
2012 
Implemented 
15. Adopt legislation for the establishment and 
functioning of the AMC in order to make it fully 
operational by November 2012. 
Autumn 2012 Implemented 
16. Submit for consultation with stakeholders' envisaged 
enhancements of the credit register. 
End-October 
2012 
Implemented 
17. Prepare proposals for the strengthening of non-bank 
financial intermediation including capital market 
funding and venture capital. 
Mid-November 
2012 
Implemented 
18. Propose measures to strengthen fit and proper rules 
for the governing bodies of savings banks and 
introduce incompatibility requirements regarding 
governing bodies of former savings banks and 
commercial banks controlled by them. 
End-November 
2012 
Implemented 
19. Provide a roadmap (including justified exceptions) 
for the eventual listing of banks included in the stress 
test which have benefited from state aid as part of the 
restructuring process. 
End-November 
2012 
Implemented  
20. Prepare legislation clarifying the role of savings 
banks in their capacity as shareholders of credit 
institutions with a view to eventually reducing their 
stakes to non-controlling levels. Propose measures to 
strengthen fit and proper rules for the governing 
bodies of savings banks and introduce incompatibility 
requirements regarding the governing bodies of the 
former savings banks and the commercial banks 
controlled by them. Provide a roadmap for the 
eventual listing of banks included in the Stress Test, 
which have benefited from State aid as part of the 
restructuring process. 
End-November 
2012 
Implemented  
21. Banks to provide standardised quarterly balance sheet 
forecasts funding plans for credit institutions 
receiving state aid or for which capital shortfalls will 
be revealed in the bottom-up stress test. 
As of 
1 December 
2012 
Ongoing –  
a reporting 
template has been 
developed 
22. Submit a policy document on the amendment of the 
provisioning framework if and once Royal Decree 
Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 cease to apply. 
Mid-December 
2012 
A document has 
been submitted, 
discussions are 
ongoing 
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Measure Date Status 
23. Issues CoCos under the recapitalisation scheme for 
Group 3 banks planning a significant (more than 2% 
of RWA) equity raise. 
End-December 
2012 
Not relevant, 
Group 3 banks 
recapitalised 
without State aid 
24. Transfer the sanctioning and licensing powers of the 
Ministry of Economy to the BdE. 
End-December 
2012 
Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
25. Require credit institutions to review, and if necessary, 
prepare and implement strategies for dealing with 
asset impairments. 
End-December 
2012  
Implemented 
26. Require all Spanish credit institutions to meet a 
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of at least 9% until at 
least end-2014. Require all Spanish credit institutions 
to apply the definition of capital established in the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), observing 
the gradual phase-in period foreseen in the future 
CRR, to calculate their minimum capital 
requirements established in the EU legislation. 
1 January 2013 Implemented 
RDL24/2012 
Additional 
technical details 
implemented by 
BoE (Circular 
7/2012) 
27. Review governance arrangements of the FROB and 
ensure that active bankers will not be members of the 
Governing Bodies of the FROB. 
1 January 2013 Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
28. Review the issues of credit concentration and related 
party transactions. 
Mid-January 
2013 
Ongoing: the 
review was 
submitted 
29. Propose specific legislation to limit the sale by banks 
of subordinate debt instruments to non-qualified retail 
clients and to substantially improve the process for 
the sale of any instruments not covered by the deposit 
guarantee fund to retail clients.  
End-February 
2013 
Implemented 
RDL 24/2012 
30. Amend legislation for the enhancement of the credit 
register. 
End-March 
2013 
In progress (Draft 
Circular received 
and under 
discussion) 
31. Raise the required capital for banks planning a more 
limited (less than 2% of RWA) increase in equity. 
End-June 2013 Not relevant 
(Group 3 banks 
recapitalised 
without State aid) 
32 Group 3 banks with CoCos to present restructuring 
plans. 
End-June 2013 Not relevant 
(Group 3 banks 
recapitalised 
without State aid) 
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